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Abstract
Lack of labour market ﬂexibility has often been accounted for the low growth rates in the
European Union. A recent report on ”An Agenda for a Growing Europe”, better known
as the Sapir Report, discussed this issue and clearly stated the terms of the trade oﬀ
between growth and lack of ﬂexibility. The Report acknowledges that ﬂexibility involves a
range of social and economic drawbacks. Nonetheless it contends that ”At a time of very
rapid change and a need to adjust both production and skills quickly, ﬂexibility comes
at a premium.”. In this paper I focus on a range of microeconomic issues, involving the
conceptual plausibility of the claimed trade oﬀ and the implications that a policy based
on such a trade oﬀ may have in terms of both growth and social welfare. I argue that the
assumptions underlying the trade oﬀ are not clear because the notion of innovation in the
Report is rather confused. Contrary to what the Report claims, ﬂexibility turns out to be
irrelevant for the innovation it purports. Flexibility might produce some eﬀects but only
with innovations that the Report neglects. I contend that the eﬀects of ﬂexibility may be
to reduce innovation and the potential for growth. Truly, ﬂexibility may allow ﬁrms to
introduce new technology, but it may also lead ﬁrms away from innovation in so far as it
allows them to pursue proﬁt through other means, i.e. through cost scrapping. My ﬁnal
argument is that the notion of trade oﬀ that the Report refers to is misleading in that it
in no way takes account of the social costs that ﬂexibility would determine. I conclude my
discussion by drawing a few implications for economic policy.
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Lack of labour market ﬂexibility has often been accounted for the low growth
rates in the European Union. A recent report on ”An Agenda for a Growing
Europe”, better known as the Sapir Report (henceforth Report), discusses
this issue and clearly frames the argument in terms of a trade-oﬀ between
growth and lack of ﬂexibility. The Report acknowledges that ﬂexibility in-
volves a range of social and economic drawbacks. Nonetheless it contends
that ”At a time of very rapid change and a need to adjust both production
and skills quickly, ﬂexibility comes at a premium.” (Report, p. 40).
Technical considerations and value judgements underlie the above con-
tention. Once they are clearly stated it is not obvious that the contention
should be so clear cut. It goes without saying, for instance, that eﬀective
demand and its impact on growth is disregarded in the Report. I will not
criticise the Report on these grounds, however. A great deal of literature has
been produced to show the negative eﬀects that restrictive ﬁscal and mone-
tary policies exert on the rate of growth (see, for instance, Arestis, Sawyer
2003). My aim is to focus on a more microeconomic set of issues. They
involve the conceptual plausibility of the above mentioned trade-oﬀ and the
implications that a policy based on such a trade-oﬀ may have in terms of
both growth and social welfare.
The paper is organised as follows. First, I argue that the assumptions
underlying the trade-oﬀ are not clear (Section 2). The Report does not
distinguish among diﬀerent types of innovation. As a result, the relation
between innovation and ﬂexibility is rather confused. Contrary to what the
Report claims, ﬂexibility turns out to be irrelevant for the type of innovation
it is in favour of, while it could produce some eﬀects only for innovations
that the Report neglects.
I then contend that the eﬀects of ﬂexibility may be precisely to reduce
innovation and the potential for growth (Section 3). Flexibility is expected
to favour the introduction of new technology but most likely it allows ﬁrms
to avoid innovation in so far as it enables them to pursue proﬁt by cost
scrapping. From this perspective the envisaged trade-oﬀ turns out to be
false. Finally, I argue that the notion of trade-oﬀ the Report refers to is
misleading in that in no way it takes account of the social costs that ﬂexibility
would determine (Section 4). I conclude my discussion by drawing a few
implications for economic policy.
12 An unexplained trade-oﬀ
The Report states that ”Flexibility allows ﬁrms to match employment with
output levels more closely. It also facilitates matching the skills and the
abilities of the labour force with speciﬁc tasks, by enabling ﬁrms to redeploy
(internal ﬂexibility) or to change skill composition of the workforce through
hiring and ﬁring (external ﬂexibility) more easily.” (Report, p. 40).1
Labour is conceived of as a resource that must ﬁt speciﬁc productive re-
quirements. The nature of these requirements is quantitative - labour must
comply with a technologically given output/labour ratio - as well as qualita-
tive: innovators must ﬁnd the appropriate workers for their new technologies.
The Report emphasises the latter aspect on the grounds that, contrary to
post-war growth, innovation - as opposed to imitation - is claimed to be
today’s main engine of growth. Furthermore, the innovation that matters
must be radical (cf. Report, p.29-30). It occurs through investment, espe-
cially in R&D. It involves new technologies, which require appropriate skills.
So if ﬁrms cannot adequately employ people who have the right qualiﬁcations
there is no point in identifying and introducing new technologies.
The Report does not provide a clear outline of what technologies it really
has in mind. On the one hand, it points out speciﬁc industries. For instance,
it recalls that recent studies stressed Europe’s weakness in the ﬁeld of com-
puters and biopharma (cf. Report, p.34-35). On the other, it focuses on the
requirements that make new technology diﬀerent from the past as a result of
changes both in production and consumption. In terms of production, new
technology provides an alternative to standardised products, which are now
fairly easy to produce in newly industrialising countries. As for consump-
tion, new technology responds to greater demand for customised goods (cf.
Report, p.29-30).
When it focuses on production, the Report basically refers to technology
as blueprints, whereby technology is nothing more than applied science: it
needs skills in order to be implemented but it is originated independently
of them.2 Organisation does not aﬀect its insurgence. This neglect of the
1A third type of ﬂexibility is wage or reward ﬂexibility, which is ”the ability of pay
and payment systems to respond to labour market conditions and to encourage improved
performance” (Michie, Sheehan 2003, p. 126). The Report does not discuss it in relation
to the ﬂexibility-innovation trade-oﬀ. As I shall point out in Section 3, even when wage
ﬂexibility is not introduced directly, it comes as a consequence of the lower bargaining
power that unions and workers have following the introduction of the other two forms.
2The diﬀerence between science and technology is clearly pointed out by Metcalfe (1998,
p. 110): ”As science is open so technology is closed, with quite diﬀerent publication prac-
tices and a natural concern for secrecy or patent protection when private property rights
are involved. Moreover, while it is essential to the replicability of scientiﬁc results that they
2co-evolution of technology and organisationnally created skills and compe-
tences deﬁnitely contrasts with the Report’s reference to customisation as
a distinctive feature of competitiveness. A more appropriate view, in this
respect, consists in conceiving of technology in broader terms: as ”tools”,
(individual) skills, the division of labour and related (ﬁrm and industrial)
competences.3 This, however, suggests that there is more to innovation than
the mere introduction of blueprints. It provides the basis for a distinction
among three types of new technologies: those related to new industries, to
new goods within previously existing industries and to new processes for
the same products. Let us ﬁrst consider how innovation aﬀects each type
separately.
The ﬁrst type typically is a case where innovation tends to be radical
and completely new plants are required. Owing to its radical novelty, such a
technology is likely to lead to the establishment of new ﬁrms as well. This is
presumably what the authors of the Report have in mind when they note that
”new entrants more easily make innovations at the frontier” (cf. Report, p.
35). But, if this type of technology is associated to new ﬁrms, the ﬂexibility
argument tends to lose its importance. At the outset, workers are employed
precisely to ﬁt the newly established technology. Doubtless, changes may be
required but they are deﬁnitely marginal: almost by deﬁnition, no restructur-
ing occurs. Highly skilled workers may have to be moved from less innovative
to more innovative ﬁrms but this type of interﬁrm ﬂexibility has nothing to
do with the ﬂexibility depicted above. In so far as innovation is proﬁtable,
wages only need to rise when there is excess demand for a given worker: this
is hardly precluded by the present state of aﬀairs. Note that this situation
is typically a temporary one. Radical innovation does not remain radical
forever. It is followed by a ﬂow of correlated innovation which consists in
improving on the original novelty and in extending it to new applications.
Thus, the ﬁrst type of innovation eventually leads to the other types.
The second type of technology is associated to new goods within pre-
existing industries. However pathbreaking the new ”tools” may be, their
use involves adaptation to the production and demand requirements of that
industry: a DVD has to ﬁt into some appliance such as a personal computer,
a hi-ﬁ equipment, a video-recorder. On the productive side some integration
with pre-existing goods and technologies is required. As for the demand
be codiﬁable, much of technical practice rests in a tacit realm only easily communicated
through observation and trial, not publication. This is why one important dimension of
technology concerns the skills of the practitioners.”
3These diﬀerent views underlie the Skill Based Technological Change Hypothesis and
the Skill Biased Organisational Change Hypothesis respectively. See Piva et al. (2003) for
as u r v e y .
3side, how the DVD is provided (the appliance it is assembled on; the shops
where it is sold) depends on how consumers relate to that type of good.
Similar considerations apply to the third type of technology: process related
technology. Here too, innovation may change a good to some extent but it
has to comply with the requirements that the latter is expected to meet in
terms of pre-existing consumer needs.
Products generally are not produced in a fully integrated industry. By
changing one of them, we aﬀect complementarities and substitutabilities in
the production of a range of other goods and services. Interdependence
involves some integration between the new technology and pre-existing in-
dustries with their technologies. Similarly, there is interdependence in con-
sumption. Single types of goods are parts of consumer baskets. They are
complements or substitutes for other types of goods. If we act on one good,
we may aﬀect the composition of the whole basket.4 In general, any innova-
tion that aﬀects customer choices must take their preferences into account.
This is especially true in a market such as the EU, where customisation is
ever more important. This suggests that even when R&D is required, a great
eﬀort must be devoted to conceiving novelty in such a way that customers
will appreciate it. The relation between marketing, production and R&D is
an interactive, not a sequential one. Interaction among technologies, ﬁrms
and departments also involves interaction among workers. Old-technology
workers must be able to interact with new technology workers. Should they
not be able to do so, the positive eﬀects of innovation would be undermined.
This is where ﬂexibility may be important. If some workers are unable to
properly interact, ﬂexibility allows ﬁrms to do away with them. Ironically,
the Report does not consider this type of innovation - which might require
ﬂexibility - as important.
The above considerations apply to all industries but, as we move from
completely new industries to new processes for pre-existing goods, productive
interdependence among distinct activities tends to rise and complementari-
ties become more important. In order to take account of this variability, it
is therefore appropriate to consider two opposite cases. The ﬁrst one is that
innovation spreads throughout the economy, thereby determining product
and process innovations in all industries.5 The degree of productive inter-
dependence is high both within and among industries. Innovation does not
involve radical changes in the industrial composition of output. The second
case is that radical innovation aﬀects new industries alone.6 Under these cir-
4This applies to consumption goods but also to intermediate and investment goods.
5Information and Communication Technology is typically viewed as one such ”general
purpose technology”. The same seems to apply potentially to nanotechnologies.
6This case seems to apply to the pharmaceutical industry.
4cumstances, if innovation is to produce any relevant eﬀect on the economy,
the new industries must grow relative to the old ones. Productive interde-
pendence occurs here as well but it basically regards the activities within the
new industry.
Consider the ﬁrst case. Complementarities generally call for creative in-
teraction: new routines need to be established that make the two types of
technologies mutually compatible. The problem-solving activities that lead
to new routines cannot but be based on pre-existing knowledge: mental mod-
els, information and heuristics that emerged over time (Egidi 1992). It is not
just a matter of blueprints but also of tacit knowledge, learning by doing
and corporate culture. Innovation may require investment in R& D at the
outset but that is deﬁnitely not the end of the story. New knowledge, not
just technology, has to substitute old knowledge (Loasby 1999).
Creative interaction is therefore required but it is only possible if workers
invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills and in ﬁrm-speciﬁc relationships, which involve
trust and tacit knowledge. Workers are willing to do so only if they know
that they are not going to lose their jobs. Furthermore, they must feel that
they are part of a common project: the ﬁrm’s goals must be their goals.
This is hardly going to happen if ﬂexibility - and the precarious professional
condition it entails - is enhanced. The Report acknowledges this issue but its
emphasis on radical innovation prevents it from appreciating its relevance.
A possible explanation for this lack of attention towards complementari-
ties and interaction may lie in recent technological evolution.7 The so-called
new economy provided a thrust to data processing and data transmission.
Consequently, codiﬁcation of previously tacit knowledge is easier and cheaper
than in the past. This enables a ﬁrm to rely less than before on the tacit
knowledge of its workers and to organise its activities into relatively stan-
dardised and independent modules.
The above process allows the ﬁrm to focus on its core competence and
to outsource the rest. Market transactions substitute intra-ﬁrm transactions
even when complementarities are involved. Tacit knowledge and trust are
downplayed, thereby reducing the innovative capacity associated to (ﬁrm-
related) competences.8 Productive specialisation occurs but, because of stan-
dardisation, it neglects adaptation and customisation - thus product diﬀeren-
tiation - and favours price competition. Ironically, since complementarities
and competences are less important, many workers turn out to be useless
from the ﬁrm’s point of view and ﬂexibility is the best way to get rid of
7Caroli (2003) provides a discussion of this issue.
8Signiﬁcant contributions to the competence theory of the ﬁrm are G.B. Richardson
(1972/1990), C.A. Montgomery (1995), N.J. Foss, B.J. Loasby (1998), D.J. Teece, G.
Pisano (1998), A. Amin, P. Cohendet (1999), Dosi et al. (2000).
5them.9 This may make sense for radical innovators, i.e. to those who create
the ﬁrst type of technology depicted above. For the remaining ﬁrms, how-
ever, this is a blind alley. If they forsake innovation based on ﬁrm-related
competences but are unable to carry out radical innovation, they are either
outcompeted by ﬁrms in countries where costs are lower or they can survive
only by complying with the requirements of innovative ﬁrms, who obviously
will take advantage of their market power.10
This leads us to the second case, where innovation is industry speciﬁc.11
Under these circumstances, the new industry must substitute previously ex-
isting industries. Flexibility is believed to provide the means to accelerate
the process in that it prevents workers from sticking to their old jobs. As I
mentioned above, however, in so far as there is excess demand for workers,
new (proﬁtable) industries can pay higher wages and attract workers away
from old (non proﬁtable) industries. Flexibility may accelerate the process
but it is not essential.
In sum, if we focus on radical innovation as such, ﬂexibility is not neces-
sary. If we consider other types of innovation, ﬂexibility may cause damage
to ﬁrms as well as workers. One should therefore expect ﬁrms not to pay
much attention to the issue. In some instances ﬂexibility may allow ﬁrms
to reduce their costs - or, one might suggest, to shift their costs on to the
community12 - but this issue is not strictly related to innovation. So, under
these circumstances, we might feel free to conclude that, since a trade-oﬀ
between ﬂexibility on the one hand and innovation and growth on the other
is rather diﬃcult to identify, the whole ﬂexibility issue is overstated, if not
downright irrelevant. Unfortunately this is not the case.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is no excess demand for
workers who are employed by old industries or that it is not as intense as
optimists would have it13 Flexibility would then do little in terms of the inter-
industry shift. It would only allow ﬁrms in the old industry to reduce the
9Note that the depicted causal relation is the opposite of what the Report refers to: it
is innovation that has made ﬂexibility possible, not the other way round.
10This is consistent with evidence from Italy, where ﬁrms are forced to rely on organi-
sational change if they are to survive. See Piva et al. (2003).
11At the level of the economy as a whole, modularisation reduces the importance of
complementarities. It is therefore more appropriate to refer to activities rather than
industries. More speciﬁcally, innovation throughout the economy involves a shift from
activities where innovation does not occur to activities where innovation does occur. For
simplicity’s sake, however, I will use the term industries.
12This is the central - and neglected - theme of Kapp (1963). See also Swaney, Evers
(1989).
13Excess demand in the labour market may exist nonetheless. It may relate to workers
who, precisely because of their skills, are unlikely to be employed by old industries.
6wage bill. Apparently, this would be beneﬁcial in that it would determine a
rise in competitiveness and/or proﬁtability albeit in backward industries. In
the next section I will argue that, quite to the contrary, ﬂexibility is likely to
induce ﬁrms to behave in a way that is proﬁtable in the short run but that
precludes innovation and proﬁtability in the long run.
3A f a l s e t r a d e - o ﬀ
Let us return to the notion of innovation and technology that the Report
refers to. Technology is a source of growth but it also involves a range of
constraints. From the point of view of single ﬁrms, the faster innovation is the
more diﬃcult it is to repay past investment. On the other hand, ﬁrms that
do not innovate may be excluded by competitors who do. This determines a
great deal of uncertainty, so that ”virtuous” behaviour cannot be determined
a priori. Two reasons are worth pointing out. First, given the opposite risks
involved, a ﬁrm must choose its rate of innovation in the light of what other
ﬁrms choose: if other ﬁrms choose not to innovate too quickly, it has the
time to recover past investment and possibly reduce its ﬁnancial exposure. If
the opposite occurs, it has to keep up with innovation even though this may
increase its exposure. This leads to the classical paradox whereby each ﬁrm
can formulate its expectations/decisions only when other ﬁrms have already
formulated theirs.14 Second, the rate of radical innovation is rather diﬃcult to
predict. Although innovation usually occurs within the guidelines provided
by a technological paradigm, it is by deﬁnition something that cannot be
known in advance. It is therefore diﬃcult to determine in advance what
amount of investment is required to originate innovation. As a result, it is
easy for the rate of investment in R&D to be either too high or too low
relative to expectations, thereby leading to subsequent adjustments both by
the investing ﬁrm and by its competitors. The result is that variability of
investment and uncertainty are likely to feed on themselves, independently
of how ”rational” ﬁrms attempt to be in their decision-making process. The
Report implicitly acknowledges this situation by stating that, ”Because of
the greater degree of uncertainty stemming from radical innovation, a higher
degree of turbulence ensues as the selection procedure weeds out those new
ﬁrms that fail to make it in the market and those existing ﬁrms that fail to
adapt in time.” (Report, p. 35).
It is therefore reasonable to believe that ﬁrms will attempt to escape this
situation. What is at issue is whether they can. Conventional wisdom would
14This is a case of the so-called Richardson Paradox (Richardson 1959; Foss, Loasby
1998).
7argue that the answer generally is no. Innovation improves the techniques
whereby ﬁrms meet consumer needs so it provides an incentive to the growth
of individual (ﬁrm) proﬁt. Competition, in turn, sanctions whoever does
not take advantage of innovation-related opportunities: if a ﬁrm does not
innovate, consumers seek better products elsewhere. Finally, the pace and
direction of innovation lie beyond the control of single ﬁrms. They cannot
prevent it or slow it down because rival ﬁrms would take advantage of the
opportunity. They cannot aﬀect its direction because a single ﬁrm’s innova-
tion is only a small section of overall innovation and, above all, because the
direction of innovation ultimately depends on what consumers want.15
This view of technology and of the constraints it poses on the behaviour
of ﬁrms is rather restrictive. It is true that, while a single ﬁrm may act
upon the ﬂow of innovation, it cannot act upon technology as a whole. It
is therefore true that a single ﬁrm is constrained by existing technology and
by the dominating technological paradigm. This is less true for ﬁrms as a
whole, however.
Let us focus on the direction of innovation. In order to simplify matters,
let us disregard changes in the level of eﬀective demand and assume that it
remains constant. This is an unrealistic assumption, because the conducts
that I will be discussing do aﬀect demand. It is nonetheless reasonable to
assume that such changes complicate but do not change the main conclusions
of the argument.16
If aggregate demand is constant a single ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt in
one of the following ways.17 It may sell more, all other things given. Since
aggregate demand is given, it has to increase its relative share of sales, i.e.
the amount of its sales over total sales. In other terms, it has to increase its
sales at the expense of some other ﬁrm. From the perspective of this work,
this is where competitiveness and innovation come into the picture. Note,
however, that this situation involves a clash of interests between ﬁrms which
may also involve a price war or other forms of rivalry: advertising, alliances
with other ﬁrms, political lobbying, carving out of market niches, etc..
The second way a ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt is to cut direct costs in
order to raise its mark up at the expense of its workers. Here too, the ﬁrm is
15These circumstances may change in oligopolistic or monopolistic markets.
16A further assumption is that ﬁrms do not give up their core business in order to
move into industries where competition is milder (usually the service industry and, more
generally, the non trade sectors) or where gains involve little sunk costs (ﬁnance) and no
production. This, too, is a restrictive assumption, which only aims to focus on innovation
strategies. The relevance of inter-industry moves is pointed out by Bianchi (2003) with
respect to Italy.
17A more detailed discussion of what follows is in Ramazzotti (2004).
8pursuing competitiveness but at the expense of its workers. The ensuing clash
of interests may cause a range of reactions: workers may go on strike; qualiﬁed
workers may resign and look for better jobs; trust and cooperation within
the organisation may wither away, thereby undermining the investment in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills by the workers and, more generally, their involvement in
creative and innovative processes.
The third way is to change relative prices within the value chain: to charge
downstream ﬁrms more and to pay upstream ﬁrms less.18 This strategy is
somewhat similar to the previous one: from the ﬁrm’s point of view, it is
just another way to cut costs. It is probably not as intuitive. Apparently, in
so far all ﬁrms can innovate in their core business, they are all on an equal
standing, i.e. they can all be proﬁtable. This is not the case when a ﬁrm
holds a key position in the value chain. When this occurs, other ﬁrms may
well innovate but this does not provide them with any greater market power:
they simply have to comply with the requirements of the leading ﬁrm.19 In
other terms, by outsourcing, the leading ﬁrm may enhance the division of
labour and create a more innovative environment but it also shifts its costs
on to the weaker links of the value chain.20 Here, too, distributive conﬂict
may undermine the cooperation that ﬁrms within the same value chain need.
Since the main issue this paper is concerned with is labour market ﬂexibility
and technological innovation, I will not discuss this third strategy in greater
detail.
When ﬁrms choose their strategy - i.e. how to pursue their proﬁt goal
- they must take into account at least two problems. The ﬁrst one is what
ﬁelds of action are viable. Three ﬁelds have been outlined: competing ﬁrms,
ﬁrms in the same value chain and workers. Viability is likely to depend on
how intensively other parties are going to react and wage a war to defend
their income shares. Thus, if competition is very ﬁerce and upstream and
downstream ﬁrms have a high bargaining power while the unions do not, a
strategy that is most likely to prevail is a cost scrapping one, based on wage
cuts and/or a redeﬁned organisation of production.
The second problem is the time range that is relevant to the ﬁrm. In the
long run some strategy may be optimal, but pursuit of such a strategy may
imply that in the short run the ﬁrm will not survive.21 Thus, technological
18This also includes imports and exports of intermediate goods in an open economy.
19Lombardi (2003) provides an interesting outline of how this is occuring in Italian local
production systems.
20This cost shifting among ﬁrms parallels cost shifting from ﬁrms to workers - and the
community - that I mentioned at the end of the previous section.
21Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis (Minsky 1982) and his notion of money man-
ager capitalism (Minsky 1993) are both important in this respect. A recent assessment of
9upgrading - and the resulting competition with other ﬁrms on the ﬁnal good’s
market - may be appropriate in the long run but, if interest rates and/or
uncertainty are high, cost scrapping - at the expense of workers - may be a
more appropriate measure to achieve short run proﬁtability.
Competitiveness may be achieved by acting on any one of the three ﬁelds
of action. The competitivity it achieves, however, is not the same. In con-
ventional textbook terms, product innovation attempts to make the ﬁrm’s
demand curve steeper whereas cost scrapping lowers the marginal cost curve.
In terms of the ﬁnal good’s market, this makes a diﬀerence which has to do
with the price-elasticity of demand as well as with potential entry by new
competitors. Price-elasticity depends on various circumstances but a key
determinant is the income of the economy where the goods are sold. High
income economies, like the present EU, tend to be less sensitive to prices than
lower income countries. Consequently, a low cost niche in such markets may
well persist but it is doubtful that domestic growth in output, determined
by low prices, can compensate the lower proﬁtability caused by low proﬁt
margins.
Let us see how this relates to ﬂexibility and innovation. Flexibility allows
ﬁrms to cut costs because of two circumstances. First, it allows ﬁrms to re-
structure the organisation of production independently of radical innovation,
i.e. without having signiﬁcantly to upgrade the technology used. Some sort
of process innovation has to occur, since new machinery is usually required,
but the nature of the industry and of the single goods may remain the same.
From the point of view of single ﬁrms, the advantage of such a strategy is
that it aﬀects the production process alone, so it does not involve the uncer-
tainty that a new industry or a new product entail. The obvious consequence
is that a ﬁrm does not have to make any risky investment. Second, precisely
because ﬂexibility allows a ﬁrm to easily restructure its production process
and to dismiss its workers, it raises its bargaining power in relation to the
latter. As a result, the ﬁrm may renounce restructuring if the workers are
willing to cut the wage bill by reducing the wage rate. This way, the ﬁrm
does not have to invest at all.
Firms that adopt low cost strategies are subject to competition by low
cost producers from other countries, where the overall wage structure is def-
initely lower. Thus, even if a low cost niche is viable, it will eventually be
supplied through imports. Employers as such may remain unaﬀected in that
they may substitute local with foreign plants. Employment and macroeco-
nomic stability, quite to the contrary, may suﬀer dramatic consequences. It
is therefore doubtful that such strategies are appropriate. As I mentioned in
the former is in Wolfson (2002) whereas the latter is discussed by Whalen (2002).
10footnote 2, wage ﬂexibility turns out to be a natural consequence of external
ﬂexibility.
There is a further implication of this type of strategy. In so far as it
pursues competitiveness by reducing the real income of workers in industrial
countries, it slows down the shift of low value added production to less indus-
trialised countries. Since it is relatively more diﬃcult for the latter to pursue
radical innovation, they will try to enhance their own competitiveness by
cutting costs as well. The consequence is likely to be an overall worsening
of living standards in all of the countries involved, at least as far as workers
are concerned: cost shifting can be carried out across borders.
In sum, a ﬁrm - or an industry - may choose a cost scrapping strategy
because ﬂexibility makes changes in distribution more convenient than in-
novative changes. Although ﬂexibility apparently complements a strategy
based on radical innovation, it is most likely to substitute it. The eﬀects in
terms of international competitiveness and of living standards may be all but
desirable.22
The pursuit of this type of strategy is likely not to remain an isolated
phenomenon but to spread throughout the industry and, possibly, the entire
economy. First, if a ﬁrm achieves price-based competitiveness by cutting its
costs, its competitors may not have the time to pursue innovation but may
have to respond by cutting costs themselves. Second, when cost scrapping
is carried out by acting on upstream and downstream links within the value
chain, the only rough and ready solution available to the aﬀected ﬁrms is to
cut costs themselves. Third, since value chains are not integrated sectors, all
other industries may eventually be aﬀected by this type of strategy. Unfortu-
nately the same does not hold with strategies that pursue radical innovation.
They require more time and more ﬁnance and they involve a great deal of
uncertainty, so it is less likely that they will be adopted only because other
ﬁrms do.
This strategy may also persist over time. Firms choose their strategies in
relation to their competences. These depend on available information but,
above all, on the skills and routines that the ﬁrm has acquired over time.
When a ﬁrm ”specialises” in cost cutting, it is fairly diﬃcult that it may
switch to a diﬀerent type of strategy. The latter would require not only a
diﬀerent range of heuristics but also cooperation, trust and conﬁdence among
the workers and ﬁrms involved. In other terms, this type of strategy tends
to be highly path dependent.
22I chose to disregard eﬀective demand. It may be worth noting, however, that the
change in income distribution associated to wage cuts is going to aﬀect sections of the
economy where the propensity to consume is relatively high, thereby determining a nega-
tive eﬀect on growth.
11When we look at these strategies from the perspective of a regional or
national economy, a few implications emerge. First, the three strategies out-
lined above exist from the perspective of a single ﬁrm but at the aggregate
level, they boil down to two: ﬁrms either struggle to change the distribution
of given aggregate proﬁt - by either outcompeting rival producers of the same
good or by shifting costs up- or down-stream - or they try to increase the
share of proﬁt on aggregate value added by raising the aggregate mark up. It
is reasonable to believe that, even if all ﬁrms were to concentrate on the ﬁrst
type of strategy, losers would eventually move on to the second type. Sec-
ond, in an international setting, where some countries are characterised by
higher degrees of technological development or by active policies in favour of
domestic industries, ﬁrms from other countries may simply have to acknowl-
edge that they do not have the competences or the market power to compete
eﬀectively. They may therefore choose to bypass direct confrontation and
choose strategies that avoid conﬂict with rival ﬁrms. This implies choosing a
cost scrapping strategy rather than one based on radical innovation. Third,
owing to path dependence and to stricter interdependence among ﬁrms of
the same country, the chosen strategies may account for region- or country-
speciﬁc patterns of technological specialisation. In other terms, while sin-
gle ﬁrms are basically constrained by existing technology, taken as a whole
they ”choose” the direction of technological development: they may focus on
(qualitative) innovation or on mere cost scrapping.
The upshot of the above discussion is that it is reasonable for ﬁrms to
avoid the uncertainty associated to innovation. If they choose not to innovate
the reason does not lie in some improper functioning of the market - a ”mar-
ket failure” - but in the way ﬁrms interact (Richardson 1972) and, in a more
general perspective, in the features of an economy where ”single-exit solu-
tions” hardly exist (Latsis 1976; Groenewegen, Vromen 1997). This allows
us to return to the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and growth. A trade-oﬀ tells
you what you need to forsake (lack of ﬂexibility) in order to achieve a goal
(an x% growth rate). In order to be eﬀective, such a relation must not change
over time, at least not in a signiﬁcant manner: aside from possible exogenous
shocks, the ﬂexibility-growth relation must be reliable, if not stable. The Re-
port is cautious in this respect. Although it claims that, under the present
circumstances, ”ﬂexibility comes at a premium”, it acknowledges that ﬂexi-
bility may negatively aﬀect growth by discouraging long-term investment in
transferable skills by the employer as well as investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills
by the worker (Report p. 40). It does not draw all the implications, however.
If it were to do so, the straightforward relation that the trade-oﬀ is supposed
to identify would be undermined. The Report would have to acknowledge
that exactly the opposite of what is expected may occur, i.e. that ﬂexibility
12may easily preclude radical innovation and its associated growth potential.
The conclusion would be that what is being suggested as a major policy tool
is a false trade-oﬀ.
4 A misleading trade-oﬀ
Lack of labour market ﬂexibility as a constraint on growth is a relevant issue
in so far as the latter is one of the prime goals a community is pursuing. A
great deal of literature, however, points out that income is only a proxy for
social welfare and that social costs may determine a signiﬁcant gap between
these two indicators.
Social costs of economic activity may contrast the positive eﬀects of
growth. The discussion in the previous section pointed out that when ﬁrms
resort to external ﬂexibility (dismissals) or to wage ﬂexibility (redistribution)
in order to eshew direct confrontation with their competitors, they are merely
shifting their private costs out of the ﬁrm and transforming them into social
costs. It also stressed that this situation is most likely to occur because it
reﬂects a reasonable reaction by ﬁrms to the uncertainties of an innovative
environment.
Indeed, the Report acknowledges that ”greater ﬂexibility comes at a
cost in terms of more unstable employment trajectories” (Report, p. 40)
and that ”in both the US and the UK [it] has translated into greater income
inequality both between and within groups.” (Report, p. 41). Under these
circumstances caution is required: growth may remain the prime goal only
if these costs either are relatively low or may be somehow oﬀset. To assess
whether this is the case or not some sort of social accounting is therefore
required.
One of these costs - income inequality - is somewhat easy to assess in
money terms. It is reasonable to claim that, if growth determines inequality,
its social cost amounts to the money required to oﬀset such an eﬀect through
the redistribution of income. The other cost mentioned above - the social
and psychological eﬀects of unstable employment trajectories - is deﬁnitely
more diﬃcult to assess on monetary grounds. A restrictive approach might
be to assess it in terms of the money required to overcome those eﬀects.
Nonetheless, while income redistribution - through taxes, transfers and social
welfare policy - may prevent citizens from even perceiving changes in primary
distribution - distribution that occurs before public intervention - this would
not be the case for unstable employment trajectories.
The above diﬃculty in using money in social accounting is only one in-
stance where it is reasonable to doubt that market mechanisms can prevent
13or oﬀset social costs.23 The key issue is that social costs are not only the
outcome of a malfunctioning market, what theory depicts as market failures.
They are the result of purposeful cost and risk shifting by business. From
this perspective, money is not only one out of a range of possible units of
account. It is a misrepresentation of what actually occurs in what Polanyi
(1957) termed a disembedded market.
The authors of the Report do not specify what unit of account they have
in mind. They provide no assessment whatsoever of the cost of growth but
they do assert, in a chapter explicitly devoted to ”Economic trade-oﬀs”, that
”the European experience suggests that some speciﬁc instruments chosen to
preserve cohesion in the course of the process of market liberalisation and
integration may have exerted too high a toll in terms of growth. This has
been both through limiting the deepening of such processes and through
trying to counter the unequal spreading of the resulting gains from trade in
a distorting manner at both the European and national levels.” (Report, p.
72; emphasis in the original). Reference to ”too high a toll” implies that
growth should be pursued despite the social costs it gives rise to but it is not
clear why this is so. A range of possible units of account exists that could
support such a claim. It is therefore surprising that none is mentioned and
none is used.
A plausible explanation for this shortcoming is that the authors believe
that taking account of the social and psychological costs of economic activity
is pointless.24 From this point of view reference to ”too high a toll” would
only be a rhetorical expedient, the real assertion being that ”instruments
chosen to preserve cohesion” are a burden to be done away with as soon as
possible. If one follows this line of reasoning, however, the trade-oﬀ issue
turns out to be misleading. A trade-oﬀ involves the measurement and com-
parison of the beneﬁts and costs of some action. If social cohesion is a mere
burden, there is no cost involved in removing it. The implication would be
that, leaving aside other considerations, the Report merely pays lip service
to the notion of a trade-oﬀ but it actually denies whatever relevance to social
costs. It makes the implicit, albeit common, assumption that money income
is the appropriate way to measure social welfare, which may be acceptable
for introductory economics textbooks but is rather questionable when actual
policy is discussed.
This criticism should not be considered as merely formal, i.e. that the
23This is contrary to a major tenet of the new institutionalist literature, which, as far
as this issue is concerned, dates back to Coase (1960).
24This is a rather strong claim on economic grounds. Even if social cohesion were deemed
necessary only to avoid riots or the disruption of the EU, its costs - which are induced by
social costs - turn out to be relevant and must be assessed.
14authors of the Report are not analytically rigorous. It is deﬁnitely arguable
that the gains from growth can be completely oﬀset by the worsened quality
of life determined by the relatively higher social costs of ﬂexibility. Consider,
for instance, the comparison the Report makes between the dismal growth
performance of the EU relative to the US, only to suggest that EU policy
should be more like that of the US. Despite their apparently good perfor-
mance, and although in 2001 the US has a higher per capita GDP than any
other EU (15) country - with the only exception of Luxembourg - some of
its social welfare indicators suggest that a great deal of caution is required
when making policy suggestions such as those of the Report. The table that
follows shows that its income distribution is the the most unequal among
all the countries considered and that, in the absence of appropriate direct
(money) or indirect (welfare policy) redistribution, its infant mortality rate
and the probability al birth of not surviving to the age of 60 are the highest
in the group of countries considered.
It is also interesting to note that whereas in 1980 the UNDP Human
Development Index of the US was higher than that of any EU (15) coun-
try (UNDP 2003, p. 237), in 2001 it ranked fourth, following Sweden, the
15Netherlands and Belgium (ibid., p. 241).25
The conclusion that the data leads to need not be that there inevitably is
a strict correlation between labour market ﬂexibility, income inequality and
dismal welfare indicators, even though the discussion in the previous and
present sections suggests that such a correlation is indeed possible. What
the data does corroborate is what was argued above, namely that income
and growth are objectionable indicators of social welfare.
It is noteworthy that the claims of the Report are shaky even if one leaves
aside the social implications of innovation and growth and focuses on strictly
economic matters. According to the Report, ﬁrms either innovate or they
are selected out of the market.26 Ih a v ea r g u e da b o v et h a tﬁ r m sm a yw e l lb e
proﬁtable even if they do not innovate and, possibly, for the very reason that
they do not. Selection may, therefore, keep the ﬁrms that do not innovate in,
because they are proﬁtable in the short run, and push out ﬁrms that make
a small proﬁt or are ﬁnancially exposed because they are innovating.
Let us assume, however, that all ﬁrms actually attempt to innovate. This
entails that they are faced with the uncertainty that the above mentioned
Richardson Paradox involves. As Arena and Charbit argue, ”This type of un-
certainty does not come from ignorance of the future or from the multiplicity
of the possible states of the world. It is directly related to the decentralisation
of individual decisions and to the type of division of labour which prevails
in a market economy. The simultaneous behaviours of my neighbours create
uncertainty because I cannot forecast them.” (Arena, Charbit 1998, p. 96).
Under these circumstances no ﬁrm is able to identify the proper strategy
through foresight. Potentially innovative organisations may well be selected
out of the market, so that what the Report refers to as ”weeding out” is not
the elimination of a deadweight loss. Quite to the contrary, as competition
becomes ﬁercer, selective retention may constrain variety creation. It may
constrain it to the point that instead of the growth-enhancing eﬀects of cre-
ative destruction we may be faced with the growth-precluding eﬀects of a
destructive creation: aside from an act of faith there is no reason to believe
that the former are going to prevail over the latter.
The trade-oﬀ in no way measures these eﬀects. It is even more misleading
if we recall that ”weeding out” does not consist in shutting down a ﬁrm and
allowing someone else to use its resources. If this was the case, there would
25The Human Development Index includes data on per capita GDP. This is a major
reason why it is so high for the US, compared to the other countries. See UNDP 2003, p.
237 and related footnotes for details.
26I already quoted, in section 3 the statement whereby a ”selection procedure weeds out
those new ﬁrms that fail to make it in the market and those existing ﬁrms that fail to
adapt in time.” (Report, p. 35).
16be little reason for concern. The problem is that when a ﬁrm is shut down, its
routines, thus its competences and a great deal of its accumulated knowledge,
are dispersed. Nor do mergers and acquisitions change the matter, since they
usually involve dramatic changes in the organisation of the ﬁrms.
A more cautious approach would consist in taking account of general
patterns of industrial evolution and behaviour rather than relying on a trade-
oﬀ that neglects not only social costs but also the economic costs of future
economic development.
5 A few policy implications
The conclusion the above discussion leads to is that, from a business per-
spective, there is no reason why ﬁrms should pursue radical innovation at all
costs, even if they have access to the required know how and to the required
skills. In some instances it may be more convenient to pursue strategies
which are equally, or more, proﬁtable within the relevant time range. Cost
scrapping is one such strategy. Flexibility favours it.
This is not an inevitable outcome. It can be avoided by adopting a per-
spective that escapes the shortcomings of economic orthodoxy. Conventional
wisdom focuses on structure - i.e. on market failures that prevent relative
prices from operating as they should - or on individual conduct, i.e. per-
sonal shortcomings. It considers information concerning new technology as a
twofold manifestation of a market failure: ﬁrst, in so far as it has to be discov-
ered, it contrasts with the assumption that information is available; second,
it is a public good. It therefore suggests policies that provide incentives to
invest in R&D and that contrast the practical implications of Arrow’s well
known information paradox.27 I am not concerned, here, with a discussion of
the theoretical underpinnings of such a view. It is true that the availability
of technological knowledge and skills is important. What deserves attention
is whether it is enough. Much like other types of investment, the famous
parable applies: you can provide a horse with water but that does not mean
that it is going to drink.
Just as for other types of investment, ﬁrms are less likely to demand tech-
nology if uncertainty is high, if the relevant time range is short and if there
are alternative ways to be proﬁtable. I discussed these alternative ways and
I pointed out that whether one is preferable to the others depends on a range
of circumstances that are not reducible to market failures. This suggests that
the other feature of conventional wisdom is open to doubt: any attempt to
explain the lack of innovation in terms of entrepreneurial shortcomings may
27See Report (p. 30) for a list of what should encourage research investment.
17be misleading. As Loasby (1991, p. 49) puts it: ”’Interdependence is the
reason why nothing comes out quite the way one wants it to’ (Pfeﬀer and
Salancik, 1978, p. 40). When it does not, our cognitive bias towards ratio-
nality is likely to attribute the result to managerial decisions; thus managers
become convenient heroes or scapegoats - and sometimes both in a quick suc-
cession, as we have surely all noticed.”. Lack of innovation may undoubtedly
depend on incompetent businessmen, but this should not blind us to the fact
that other circumstances must be taken into account.
The discussion in the sections above is less concerned with the ”eﬃciency”
of the market or of its agents than with the variety of strategies that the lat-
ter can choose to follow. It does not merely claim that a ﬂexibility-enhancing
policy is not based on ﬁrm theoretical grounds. It argues that it is wrong
because it is likely to achieve exactly the opposite of what it pursues. Flexi-
bility favours cost scrapping, thereby providing a viable alternative to radical
innovation, especially when ﬁrms and industries from other regions and coun-
tries have already upgraded their technology and are reaping the beneﬁts in
terms of scale and scope economies as well as in terms of market power.
Since ﬂexibility allows ﬁrms to be proﬁtable without having to innovate, any
attempt to make life easier for business by enhancing ﬂexibility is likely to
favour its ﬂight from the uncertainties of innovation. This strategy may be
successful in the short run. In the long run, however, proﬁtability is going
to be undermined by low cost producers from less industrialised countries
and from high quality producers based in the industrialised countries. Fur-
thermore, a subsequent change in policy may not be very eﬀective because
ﬂexibility undermines the conditions for an innovative environment based on
trust and cooperation.
Lack of innovation causes economic costs in terms of lack of competi-
tiveness. These economic costs are eventually shifted on to workers in that,
when they arise - e.g. when balance of payments problems arise - there is no
time left to innovate and the only way to rapidly cope with the trade balance
is to curb demand and cut costs.28 Economic costs therefore involve social
costs in that the lack of innovation eventually leads to unemployment and
to a redistribution of income which determine a lower standard of living for
workers and, possibly, other sections of society.
This does not imply that rigidity - however deﬁned - is the automatic
solution to all the problems outlined above. It would be so in a situationally
deterministic context, i.e. one characterised by single-exit solutions. This is
28For quite some time exchange rate variations provided a safety valve to some countries.
Aside from the fact that such a policy is not available for countries who adopted the Euro,
it has a disruptive eﬀect on trade integration within the economic union.
18not the kind of economy I have been discussing. Rather, I am suggesting that
we should think of the economic system as ”one made up of a large number
of parts that interact in a nonsimple way” (Simon 1981, p.195), i.e. as a
complex system. In such a system mechanistic policy prescriptions should
be treated with great caution because, in general, more than one response is
possible to any public action.
The variety of strategies that characterise a complex world suggests that
there is no unique path in technological development or in economic growth
and that we are not obliged to adapt to a clockwork economy or to the status
quo of prevailing vested interests. We can ask key questions such as: What
technology should we accept? What economy do we want?. I have basically
focused on the ﬁrst question but the possible answers relate to the second
one. I tried to point this out especially in Section 4, where I discussed the
social accounting issue. Despite its apparently technical nature, it turns out
to be of dramatic importance if only we compare two notions of social welfare:
money income and capabilities (Sen 1984, 1999). By focusing on capabilities,
we turn our attention on the freedom people have to conduct their lives. This
does not only imply that we must take due account of all social costs if we
care to promote growth. The real problem is that we are indirectly answering
the question whether society must merely adjust to the requirements of the
existing economy or identify social values that will provide the guidelines for
the economy itself.29 In this perspective the embeddedness of the economy
(Polanyi 1957) turns out to be the key issue for economic policy and, more
generally, a key political issue.
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